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Chapter 3 
Trade Associations, Change, and the New Activism 
Justin Greenwood 
 
It’s like the Alamo out there!   
It’s coming from all directions, and it’s very, very unpredictable.  There is a 
breakdown of trust and a corresponding rise in corrosive cynicism in both 
corporate activity and in mainstream politics.  Trust is the cement in the 
relationship between institutions and civil society.  When trust breaks down, 
so civil society either withdraws from participation, or expresses protest 
outside of mainstream channels of participation.  Risk related investment falls.  
Participation in elections decline, and alternative outlets of political expression 
arise.  The press becomes cynical, hostile, negative, and seeks out bad news.  
Suspicion sets in, and irresistible pressures grow for openness, transparency, 
and accountability. The information and opportunities so yielded reaps a crop 
of issues upon which cynics make hay, and the internet spills out more and 
more information, opening up new fronts as it does so. Even potential good 
news stories are interpreted and reported negatively, and those with news to 
tell become defensive and/or incommunicative.  The downward spiral 
continues.  Company managers and public affairs leaders lose the ability to 
predict when and from which direction the next missile is coming their way.   
 
These factors help to explain the climate in which brand name and other 
companies have found themselves to be targets of activism, sometimes in 
very isolated positions. The corporate world reveals a tendency to shoot itself 
in the foot by yielding a clutch of household name companies with financial 
practice scandals resulting in losses for millions and acute misery for 
thousands, raising wider public interest agendas.  Mainstream public interest 
groups are turned from potential friend into foe, and the everyday citizen 
becomes a business critic.  Politicians respond with agendas with seemingly 
limitless regulatory frontiers which catch companies on the back foot.  
 
To what extent do, and could, trade associations, as collective representative 
bodies for constituencies of companies, help?  Can they help defend their 
members in public perception, in politics, and help their members to adapt 
and respond?  Or are they simply left as by-standers in the entire process, 
and become less and less relevant to the constituencies they serve?  Where 
there is variation, what are the patterns, and causal factors, of variation? 
 
Corporate Responses  
‘Healthy, profitable, forward-thinking companies…have recognised that, in 
order to operate successfully, they must satisfy the three elements of 
sustainable development: financial, environmental, and social’ (European 
Round Table of Industrialists, 2001 p.1). 
 
The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) is a forum of (currently, 42) 
industrial leaders (at Chief Executive Officer (CEO), or Chairman, level), of 
many of the largest firms in Europe.  The position adopted by the ERT reveals 
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that large firms have come to accept that they are publicly accountable for 
their operations, and have developed programmes to communicate their 
credentials of good corporate citizenry.  Annual company reports bulge with 
details of community programmes and evidence to demonstrate that ethical 
practices of environmental, social, human rights, employee relations, and 
procurement operations are fully mainstreamed into company activities.  
These acknowledge the reality that corporate accountability now extends far 
beyond their shareholders into a much wider stakeholder constituency.  These 
realities mean that the collective public affairs wisdom that engagement in 
public debate will do more harm than good is a thing of the past for 
companies whose activities have already become issues of high politics.   
Companies at the sharp end have entered public debate, with mixed success.   
 
Inevitably, these displays are most evident among companies that have been 
most subject to criticism and activism.  Biotechnology firms such as Monsanto 
have spent hugely on newspaper advertising campaigns that are now widely 
regarded as a failure, opening new cans of worms and stirring up hornets 
nests.  Others have adopted a wider range of tactics which go beyond 
communication issues.  Among petro-chemical companies, Shell has 
responded extensively and through diffuse outlets to criticisms of its 
operations following reporting of events to which it has been connected in the 
Niger Delta, and attempts to dispose the Brent Spar oil platform.  BP has 
positioned itself as part of the solution to problems of climate change, through 
a deliberate decision to enter public debate and acknowledge the contribution 
of fossil fuels, by re-engineering itself, and through re-presenting itself to the 
public as an energy (including renewables) company ‘Beyond Petroleum’.  In 
doing so, it has won the acclaim of the media, investors, environmental 
groups, and President Clinton, resulting in an invite for the BP CEO, John 
Browne, to the White House to discuss the future of energy policy with him 
(Bryceson, 2002a).  Unilever, as the largest buyer of fish in the world and 
forewarned of a major Greenpeace campaign to target it about depletion of 
fish stocks, did likewise by establishing the Marine Stewardship Council 
partnership with the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) for brand 
differentiation of sustainable fisheries (Bryceson, 2002b).  These examples 
were not corporate gestures, but a way of engaging with change in a way 
endorsed by public interest groups and consistent with shareholder value.  
The reputational advantage for the companies concerned was considerable.   
 
What can Trade Associations do? 
These types of actions are within the remit of individual companies to take.  
An individual company responsible only for its own actions and facing bottom 
line pressures as a result of being targeted by activists will be responsive.  
Typically, new activists distinguish between leader and laggard firms, and 
single out a particular high profile ‘name’ laggard.  One company singled out 
for its performance relative to others tends to keep the problem to themselves, 
and may become inward looking rather than turn to trade associations for 
help.  Macdonalds, for instance, rarely participates in trade associations.  The 
campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences and any corporate associate was 
deliberately designed to isolate it and to make it difficult for any trade 
association or other company to come to its rescue.  Under these 
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circumstances, collective action becomes almost impossible. Christopher 
Cliffe, from Huntingdon Life Sciences is on record as complaining that trade 
associations melted away in the heat of the conflict and left his company to 
hang out to dry.  And yet, in more ‘normal’ conditions, trade associations can 
also be the ideal collective cloaks for firms, ideally suited to fronting difficult 
public affairs issues with which companies do not wish to be individually 
associated with in public profile.   
 
For companies not (yet) in the front line of target activism, some of the normal 
rules of public affairs have been modified rather than discarded.  Traditionally, 
business interest public affairs strategies have been modelled on keeping its 
interests out of the public gaze where they can be contested in open and 
unpredictable public arenas.  These strategies are aimed at confining 
corporate affairs within private, exclusive arenas with government regulators.  
Provided business has got what it wanted from these ‘behind closed doors’ 
exchanges, it has not needed to engage the public, and has only done so at 
times of desperation when it has lost the case in private arenas, risking in the 
process the privileged relationship it has enjoyed with government.  Thus, the 
successes of trade associations are private, and their failures public.  
Collectively, business has used trade associations as the ‘head above the 
parapet public voice’ when it has failed to secure its objectives in public policy.  
One example is the extensive newspaper advertising campaigns by the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) against government 
proposals in the mid 1980s for a limited list of prescribable drugs available 
under the National Health Service (NHS).  As well as being unsuccessful, 
these type of campaigns have almost always been counter productive.  Thus, 
Kenneth Clarke, as Health Minister, publicly criticised the ABPI 
advertisements by the industry as deliberately alarmist because they seemed 
to imply to some that medicines would no longer be available under the NHS.   
 
These lessons were learnt by trade associations, and rarely repeated 
thereafter.  What has emerged instead is an adaptation involving a more 
targeted use of newspaper advertising by associations and companies, aimed 
not at the general public but more at policy makers by locating the specialist 
media outlets which policy practitioners read.  European Voice is a Brussels 
based newspaper with a circulation of a little over 40,000, whose readers are 
an elite band of EU policy makers, public affairs practitioners, and observers. 
Consequently, the paper has frequently been the home for full page 
advertisements from both companies and trade associations.  Recent 
examples include those addressed to long term image building, such as the 
‘Pfizer Forum’ series and the EU biotechnology trade association Europabio’s 
current advertisements on biotechnology and the benefits for developing 
countries.  They also include issue fire-fighters, such as American aviation 
interests opposed to the introduction of regulation forcing them to use 
expensive ‘hush kits’ in European airspace. Engaging public opinion in this 
way has long been a role performed by American trade associations, where 
insurance, chemical, brewing, and tobacco trade associations have frequently 
mounted major educational efforts through outlets such as the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal (Gupta and Brubaker, 1990). 
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These type of industries have learnt that some limited form of public 
engagement is unavoidable.  The internet has provided a new outlet to put 
their case in some detail. The web sites of trade associations whose 
constituents are acutely affected by ‘new activism’ usually take the opportunity 
to explain the position of their members.  Hence, a visit to the web sites of the 
UK Bioindustry Association (BIA) (www.bioindustry.org), or the European 
Cosmetic, Toiletries and Perfumery Association COLIPA (www.colipa.org), 
reveals detailed perspectives about the use of animals in scientific research 
and testing.  The first of these contains a number of statements about 
Huntingdon Life Sciences, comment which is carefully restricted to the 
general issues about intimidation by protestors rather than getting involved 
with the detailed case of the individual firm.  Thus, the new rule of thumb for 
those likely to be affected seems to be a qualified, selective use of targeted 
media devices as a means to influence its external environment.  
 
Companies targeted by a ‘common enemy’ can develop effective collective 
solutions through trade associations, although, as is discussed later, only 
under highly specific conditions.  The chlorine industry was targeted by 
Greenpeace by the slogan ‘Chlorine free by ‘93’, stimulating the formation of a 
highly effective and pro-active EU trade association, Euro Chlor, in 1989.  
Whilst this example will be discussed more fully later, the point to note now is 
that its embeddedness with policy making institutions has helped the industry 
to safely expand world production of chlorine from 35 million tons p.a. in 1993 
to 44 million in 2001 (Gilliat, 2002).  Some associations emerged as ‘issue 
niche’ organisations, developing at a later stage into a permanent and highly 
effective specialist trade association structure.  Thus, the EU business 
association, Alliance on Beverage Cartons and the Environment (ACE) 
emerged in the late 1980s in response to (unfounded) regulatory threats 
emerging from wider public interest concerns about dioxins leaking from drink 
cartons into their contents.  When the ‘scare’ receded, so the organisation 
transformed itself into a highly effective specialist trade association for carton 
board converters.  Some ‘single issue’ collective structures have arisen 
because of the inability of the trade association to tackle the underlying issues 
effectively, and have remained as separate, parallel structures to trade 
associations.  The decade old Portman group in the UK, and the Amsterdam 
group at the EU level, are both specialist structures that enable alcoholic drink 
producers to respond to social concerns about alcohol consumption.   
 
These three examples – chlorine, paper board converters, and drinks – are all 
from relatively concentrated industries populated by firms of similar size, at a 
mature stage in the product cycle, in which overcapacity and competition 
issues have periodically emerged.  It is in these circumstances in which 
collective structures can emerge, and are developed through the identity of 
grappling with a ‘common enemy’.   
 
Business Collective Action and the Social Environment: More 
Consensus than Conflict 
The cases above reveal a number of wider points about business collective 
action structures and the social environment that they address:  
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• it is not just a phenomenon of very recent years  
• it has emerged not only in response to public interest activism, but also – 
and perhaps principally – to government regulatory responses to the wider 
agenda.  Whilst public interest activism intensively consumes the 
resources of individual companies affected, the wider impact upon 
business, and the agendas of public affairs circuits, has been directed 
more towards addressing the government regulatory agenda than the ‘new 
activists.’  One network leader described the latter as a ‘minor irritant’ 
• trade associations can be in the forefront of business responses to the 
new activism, but only under highly specific circumstances 
• business has sought to address the wider issues raised in specialist 
collective action structures. 
 
Nonetheless, the wider agenda has crystallised in recent years into a 
relatively new phrase, that of ‘corporate social responsibility,’ reflecting and 
resulting from initiatives led by both business, and public authorities, to come 
to terms with the wider agendas.  It has become a mainstream political issue, 
and developing partnership with mainstream public interest groups has 
become an orthodox public affairs strategy. Set alongside the context of ‘new 
activism’, engaging with public interest groups has become a relatively 
attractive and civilised prospect, and the opportunity to learn in such a way 
that skirmishes with ‘new activists’ might best be avoided.  Alcohol Concern 
and the European Public Health Alliance may well be public critics of the 
drinks industry, but they can at least be engaged in dialogue, learnt from, and 
possibly even tamed. As Sabatier’s model of policy change reminds us, these 
exchanges become meaningful over time, as policy actors trade perspectives 
and incorporate aspects of each other’s agendas (Sabatier, 1988). ‘Light’ 
green organisations such as WWF have become much sought after partners 
for companies and trade associations, while even ‘darker’ green organisations 
such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have become acceptable 
organisations to listen to and seek to learn from.  Greenpeace, itself, has 
been subject to criticisms that it has become over institutionalised by this 
process, de-radicalised, and has lost its independent campaigning capacity 
(Chapter 1).   
 
There is now a mature tradition of purposeful alliances between private and 
public interest groups, and some of these have now developed into formal 
organisations bridging these range of interests.  Some have emerged from 
business led initiatives, while others have arisen from actions by public 
authorities seeking ‘concertation’ between diverse stakeholders.  One 
example of the latter organisations is the European Partners for the 
Environment (EPE), a European Commission initiated structure under the EU 
Environmental Vth Action Programme (Lenschow, 1999), and now operating 
as an independent association.  This organisation brings together public 
interest groups (such as WWF and the European Environmental Bureau) with 
business (such as Unilever and Procter and Gamble) and trade unions 
(including the European Trade Union Congress - ETUC) and public (mainly 
local) authorities, to:  
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build the ground for consensus on sustainability...dialogue built through 
long-term relationships between partners and strengthened by trust 
leads to common practical action...partners meet in an informal 
atmosphere to float ideas, seek common solutions and constructively 
engage in debate and projects of mutual interest. Each partner takes 
away this learning and feeds it into the work of his or her own 
organisation (EPE, 2002). 
  
These relationships are more common between private and public interests 
than are conflict and confrontation.  Admittedly, they are more common to 
Brussels than to member state environments, because Brussels politics is 
almost solely institutional politics in which popular protest activities are all but 
absent.  Nonetheless, dialogue is more common than daggers at the national 
level.  All mainstream public affairs consultancies have developed brokering 
services for companies with public interest groups, and have developed 
services for NGOs with the more lucrative corporate brokering role in mind.  
Many such consultancies now employ ex public interest group activists to 
enhance their capacity to do this and to add to their profile.  And a new branch 
of public affairs consultancy has emerged, geared at advising business how to 
engage with its critics in civil society, how to talk to them, and how to learn 
from them.   
 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Political Institutions 
 
A recent Green Paper from the European Commission on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) defines the concept as one 
 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis (European Commission, 2001, p.4). 
 
A successor Commission Communication, together with the wider course of 
European politics, reveals the width and extent of the CSR agenda (European 
Commission, 2002). CSR has become a window of opportunity for both 
business and its opponents, and a regulatory bag wide enough to include just 
about anything.  For instance, a recent European Parliament debate on the 
Green Paper saw an attempt to introduce measures to regulate corporate 
(only) lobbying (Public Affairs Newsletter, 2002).  The 2002 Communication 
dreams of integrating CSR in all EU policies, ranging from Employment and 
Social Affairs, and policies concerned with Enterprise, the Environment, 
Consumer affairs, Public Procurement, External Relations and Trade, and 
Public Administrations.  Indeed, one of the strategic priorities of the EU 
agreed by member states and the Commission at the Lisbon Summit of March 
2000, reflects the wider debate of CSR through the EU goal of becoming, by 
2010,  
 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion (European Commission, 2002, p.4). 
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The Commission CSR agenda is being driven by the Directorate General for 
Employment and Social Affairs, which has become the most expansionist and 
politically committed of the Commission’s services.  This directorate has 
aggressively sought to expand the frontiers of European integration into 
‘social Europe’ by using a mixture of compelling rhetoric and by initiating and 
nurturing public interest groups able to act as a demand constituency upon 
member states for European integration.  In this way, organisations such as 
the European Women’s Lobby have been able to progress discourses of 
equality which member states find hard to resist, and engage member states 
to successfully propose the introduction of new competencies into the EU 
Treaties (Helfferich and Kolb, 2001).  In CSR, Directorate General 
Employment and Social Affairs is also seeking to team up with public interest 
groups to develop an expansionist agenda, and is seeking to free its hand to 
act by using classic divide and rule strategies.  The Communication reflects 
that business wants to avoid regulation, while labour, public interest, and to a 
certain extent also some constituencies of investors, seek regulation.  It 
proposes to establish a ‘Multi Stakeholder Forum’ bringing together 40 
European representative organisations of employers, employees, consumers 
and civil society as well as professional associations and business networks, 
and to report by 2004. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Led Initiatives 
The EU agenda has succeeded in putting business on the back foot.  It could 
never be otherwise at a time when the regulatory window of opportunity 
includes Enron as well as Swampy.  Business interest associations at the EU 
level have responded predictably, arguing that measures to achieve CSR 
should be left to the voluntary initiative of companies themselves, and pointing 
to the progressive record of many.  In addition, both the ERT and the Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) have argued 
that EU level legislation is unnecessary because of the existence of global 
level initiatives.  These include the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Tripartite Declaration, the United Nations (UN) Global Compact, and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, favoured by the ERT.  Some of these have 
resulted from input from trade unions and public interest groups as well as 
business.  ERT and UNICE joined forces, along with the business forum 
Corporate Social Responsibility Europe, to write a joint letter to the President 
of the European Commission in June 2002, putting the above case.   
 
ERT and UNICE, as well as the EU Committee of the American Chamber of 
Commerce, the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, and 
Europabio, have began to be targeted themselves by activists, and in 
particular by Corporate Observatory Europe (COE).  COE  describes itself as 
a research and campaign group that 
 
exposes the threats to democracy, equality, social justice and the 
environment posed by the economic and political power exercised by 
corporations and their lobby groups…(and) endeavours to support 
progressive groups whose interests are threatened by corporate conduct 
(Balanyá et al, 2000, p.xi). 
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The ERT has been particularly singled out by COE because of the ‘malevolent 
impacts of its influence’ (ibid.), publishing a photograph of its members and 
summary details of any transgressions of their companies.  Much of this 
activity, however, seems to have gone unnoticed by the associations 
themselves, and appears to be limited to critical literature production.  The 
only demonstrations witnessed by the Brussels headquarters of UNICE have 
come from symbolic publicity stunt events organised by its institutional 
sparring partner, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and not 
by ‘new activists’. EU oriented protest tends to find national rather than EU 
targets (Imig and Tarrow, 2001), and EU politics is institutional politics rather 
than the politics of social movement.  Nonetheless, it is true of most 
environments that trade associations have rarely been the target for protest.   
 
On the whole, trade associations have not been in the front line of business 
led initiatives about Corporate Social Responsibility.  Some of the principal EU 
business associations were not even consulted by the Commission in the 
formulation of its policy papers.  While all the main EU associations have 
position papers on it, the leading organisations have been best practice 
business networks which have emerged in specific response to CSR, such as 
Corporate Social Responsibility Europe.  CSR Europe describes itself as a  
 
business to business network for corporate social responsibility in 
Europe…Our mission is to help companies achieve profitability by 
placing Corporate Social Responsibility in the mainstream of business 
practice (CSR Europe, 2002). 
 
CSR Europe’s 60 company members include brand name companies such as 
BP, BT, Coca Cola, Diageo, EdF, Ford, General Motors, Hewlett Packard, 
IBM, L’Oreal, Levis, Microsoft, Motorola, Nestlé, Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
Proctor and Gamble, Shell, and Unilever. CSR Europe comments that the 
interest of many of its members arise from their past mistakes that have 
damaged their reputation and business operations.  In addition to offering the 
opportunity for good positioning and exchange of best practice, CSR Europe 
interacts with governments and with public interest groups, inviting Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch to speak at member meetings.  It has 
a network of national partners, and once again it is not horizontal general 
business associations which dominate, but CSR specific business networks.   
 
As with the EU context, associations such as the Confederation of British 
Industry have a position on CSR (opposed to enforcement; concern about 
diverting business from core mission of wealth creation), but leave the 
mainstay of activities to specialist networks.  The web site of the CBI’s Trade 
Association Forum leaves no evidence of any activities in corporate social 
responsibility.  Instead, CSR as a horizontal business issue is primarily 
developed by a clutch of specialist networks, such as the UK Business in the 
Community (BITC) organisation.  BITC is a network of over 650 UK based 
companies, including 75 of the 100 largest publicly quoted firms, and is a 
national partner of CSR Europe.  BITC members commit themselves to  
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continually improving, measuring and reporting the impact their business 
has on the environment, marketplace, workplace and community, and 
actively engaging in partnerships to tackle disadvantage and create 
enterprising communities (BITC, 2002). 
 
BITC is one of a number of UK business networks concerned with corporate 
social responsibility, alongside organisations such as Common Purpose, the 
Institute of Business Ethics, and the Prince of Wales International Business 
Leaders Forum where multinational companies address concerns with 
developing economies.  Many of these organisations have overlapping 
membership, revealing the strong identity and positioning that comes with the 
membership badge.  Corporate Social Responsibility has become high politics 
– the subject of a recent address to the US nation by President Bush – and so 
business has needed specialist identity organisations to allow companies to 
demonstrate their credentials, rather than hiding their bushels through trade 
associations.   
 
Some of the larger trade associations have historically developed symbolic 
activities that resemble corporate social responsibility activities, such as 
community relations schemes, or the projection of innovative member practice 
(such as the ‘Eco house’) in annual reports for positioning purposes.  The 
largest UK trade association, the Association of British Insurers, has operated 
a modest staff secondment scheme in conjunction with Business in the 
Community, seconding up to four staff for limited projects involving around 40 
hours work with charities (Boleat, 2001).  These limited activities provided a 
means of staff development for the association, as well as positioning, but 
rarely involved the mainstreaming of corporate social responsibility activities 
in the work of the association or in developing mainstreamed CSR practice 
among its members.   
 
Trade Associations and the New Activism: Opportunities and 
Limitations 
 
To some, trade associations are simply by-passed by the ‘new activism.’  One 
experienced (EU) public affairs practitioner who has worked for a large 
company public affairs office, an international public interest group, and a 
public affairs consultancy, reflected to the author that  
 
(new activism) is precisely one reason why trade associations are in 
decline.  Campaigning organisations focus on brand name companies, 
differentiate between leaders and laggards, and certainly try to get past 
trade associations.  Even the NGOs get fed up with trade associations, 
and frustrated with their lowest common denominator positions (just as 
politicians do) and seek out the company spokesperson.  Look at 
‘Beyond Philanthropy’ by Oxfam/Voluntary Service Overseas/Save the 
Children (oxfam.org.uk), for example, no mention of the EU, 
International, or US pharmaceutical manufacturers trade associations.  
They have become irrelevant on the access to medicines issue 
(personal correspondence, October 2002). 
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Whilst public affairs consultants need to be sceptical of trade associations 
because they provide alternative services, this hostile view of trade 
associations is worth recording. because it is not an uncommon one, and for 
some the ‘new politics’ of activism is one that makes trade associations 
irrelevant.  But it is a very one-sided view of their capabilities.  As has been 
outlined, their potential to act as collective cloaks for their members on 
controversial issues that companies would rather not argue the case for 
alone, make trade associations perfectly placed to bring value to their 
members by engaging those who directly target their industries. 
 
Certainly, trade associations have structural limitations. They are collective 
bodies, and any process of aggregating opinion between different entities 
involves some degree of compromise, and delays in responding to issues as 
common positions are built. But emphasising the diluted nature of opinion and 
sluggish response times are rather cheap points to make about organisations 
whose purpose it is to find common positions and act upon them. The flip side 
is to reflect on the ‘miracle,’ as the former General Secretary of UNICE has 
put it, of being able to reach common positions to a sufficient level to enable 
them to act upon them (Tyszkiewicz, 2002).  The legitimacy of trade 
associations arises from the breadth of constituency they encompass.  The 
alternative of multiple dialogues and outright public affairs competition is an 
unacceptable scenario for political institutions and private interests alike.  
Membership of trade associations is normal political behaviour, and for 
anything other than the smallest firms the costs of non-membership, and the 
inability to influence the positions the associations take, is too high.   
 
The view above also ignores the high degree of variation between trade 
associations, which differ in their capacities as a result of the environment in 
which they operate and the extent to which there are shared interests among 
their members.  At one extreme lie associations in Germanic Europe, where 
they form part of corporatist governance systems in which they regulate the 
activities of their members.  At the other are associations in highly pluralist 
political systems in which associations compete with each other and their 
members, to influence public policies.  Typically, political systems in which 
decision making is highly fragmented afford a high degree of access to 
decision making, but low degrees of influence, because the dispersal of 
authority insulates the system from special interest capture.  In these 
circumstances, decision making institutions accept all comers, and 
associations compete for voice with their members.  In political systems 
where power and decision making is concentrated, the reverse is true.  That 
is, access is difficult but, once obtained, private interests can be highly 
influential (Risse-Kappen, 1995).  Hence, to observers embedded in the EU 
political system, the limitations of trade associations may be more striking 
than their strength.  In pre-war Germany, where 50% of regulation directed at 
industry was exercised by controls exerted by trade associations, such 
organisations look very significant indeed (Hollingsworth and Schneider, 
1991).  In other comparative settings, associations can act as agents of 
economic development (Doner and Schneider, 2001). In the right 
circumstances, trade associations can act as powerful intermediaries between 
state and civil society, delivering the compliance of their members for 
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governance mechanisms in return for a place at the policy making table and 
the award of a near monopoly of governmental recognition.  These advanced 
roles are not possible in fragmented authority structures such as the EU 
where there is no central authority to grant associations these roles.    
 
As well as operating in a fragmented authority system, EU trade associations 
also face the disadvantage of being restricted function organisations.  They 
are designed for political representation in EU institutions.  They do not 
undertake the wider range of functions, such as membership services, that 
can be found among national associations.  Consequently, they operate on a 
more restricted resource base in that they are almost totally reliant on 
membership subscriptions.  This means that they lack autonomy from their 
members, and become communication media for the short- term demands of 
their members.  To bring value to its members, an association needs 
autonomy from them so as to lead their perceptions of where their interests lie 
on issues. As one commentator has observed, it is ‘better that my interests 
are represented than my more-or-less shaky opinions’ (Burnheim, in Phillips, 
1995).This requires a substantial heritage of trust between members and their 
association, a product of both structural industry features in which competition 
is limited, and the usual dynamics of inter-personal relations in which trust is 
earned over time.  
 
These factors also help explain preferences within political institutions for 
associations or firms.  The structural weaknesses transmitted to associations 
as a result of working within fragmented power systems means that they have 
limited utility to bring value to policy makers.  When confronted with weak and 
poorly resourced associations, policy makers turn to companies for 
information, ideas, and assistance with governance.  When associations can 
deliver these things as well as concerted, collective opinion, and simplify the 
consultative life of policy makers, so policy makers prefer associations.  Even 
in relatively difficult circumstances, however, trade associations can still be 
important players, and political systems find it difficult to live without them.  
Thus, in the EU, trade associations help the resource slim political institutions 
by providing information and expertise, yield intelligence about national 
differences and advance warning about political issues in the Council of 
Ministers, and the capacity for implementation.  They also offer the 
opportunity for remote political institutions to overcome their remoteness from 
street level concerns by acting as a bridge.  They have also provided a means 
for policy implementation, and are the powerhouse in street level European 
integration through the support they provide to their members to participate in 
the structures of European standardisation.  By doing so, they lower 
transaction costs for a wide range of stakeholders beyond their own 
members. 
 
The ability of an association to bring value to its members also depends upon 
the extent to which its constituency has shared interests.  Typically, 
associations work well where their member companies are of a similar size, 
where an industry is relatively concentrated, where there is some degree of 
maturity in the product cycle, where there are commodity products which are 
difficult to differentiate on factors other than price, and where there are 
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common shared problems such as overcapacity which the association can 
help manage (Greenwood, 2002; see also Bennett, 1999).  These features 
also make industries prone to cartel like behaviour.  Associations representing 
industries with a ‘common enemy’ also tend to have a high degree of unity 
and cohesion.  Hence, associations that work well for their members are 
those in sectors such as steel, cement, and chlorine, while those in which 
associations are marginal players are those in sectors such as tourism and 
retail.  Typically, the former set of collective organisations finds high 
membership densities and a high degree of trust between members of an 
association, while the latter type of association displays low membership 
densities and low intra-member trust.   
 
Thus, some associations are very well geared to taking political action on 
behalf of their members, displaying a high level of shared values and the 
capacity to act relatively quickly.  Because of these attributes, together with 
stable and appropriate leadership, the European chlorine association, Euro 
Chlor, has become the normal route for political action by its members rather 
than one of a number of channels.  It has developed a monopoly on the 
supply of information aggregated at a certain level, and is regarded by its 
interlocutors in policy making institutions as a more reliable source of 
information on chlorine and pollution than are national governments.  It has 
been well able to develop self regulation which makes itself useful to public 
authorities by undertaking public protection functions, but and to its members 
by deflecting governmental regulation over which it has less control.  It has 
bought its members sufficient time to adapt their production processes from 
the use of mercury to manufacture chlorine, to other processes.  It has 
prevented its members who do not use mercury in their production processes 
from threatening the business of competitors who do, through focusing upon 
common interests.  Not only is the association well equipped to respond to 
threats by ‘new activists’, a principal source of its collective action capability is 
the threat posed by its members ‘common enemy’, Greenpeace. 
 
Conclusion 
Trade associations belong to the world of order and organisation rather than 
chaos and unpredictability. These paradoxes help explain why the same 
factors which make them strengths in ‘Alamo’ climates are also those that 
make them weaknesses.  When order and structure break down, trade 
associations can be an anchor and a familiar routine against uncertainty.  
Their routinised and bureaucratised structures can also make them ill 
equipped to deal with change and unconventional contexts. 
 
Yes, trade associations are slower to act than are single companies who do 
not have to composite a range of views.  Companies will always be best 
placed to re-engineer themselves to adapt to new expectations that they be 
accountable for their social and environmental performance, as well as to 
direct targeting from activists.  Certainly, business responses to corporate 
social responsibility have emerged outside of trade associations.  But the 
important point is that these responses have arisen in collective structures 
that resemble interest associations.  As single issue organisations, business 
led corporate social responsibility organisations are best able to respond to 
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the needs of business. They provide the opportunity for good corporate 
positioning by enabling firms to demonstrate the badge of good citizenship.  
They help deflect the threat of governmental regulation.  And they help 
disseminate best practice.  As new organisations, business led corporate 
social responsibility organisations can be responsive.  All organisations 
become conservative and bureaucratised with age, and trade associations are 
no exception.  Trade associations have wider agendas, and it is not surprising 
that they are peripheral players in the debate on corporate social 
responsibility.   
 
Yet trade associations are by no means without value to business in the 
contexts of new agendas for accountability, and activism.  Trade associations 
help their members to engage with politics by providing internal fora for 
exchange between members, and in political socialisation.  They become 
learning organisations for their members.  They provide an outlet for members 
to engage regulatory authority, help to prevent hostile agendas from 
escalating, and deliver alternative self regulatory governance solutions which 
policy makers find attractive because of their low transaction costs.  They can 
broker partnerships and dialogue with mainstream public interest groups from 
which their members learn and adjust.  And they help address activist 
agendas by providing a collective cloak to engage with issues that companies 
find difficult to take on alone.   
 
Trade associations are extremely sensitive to the political environment in 
which they operate.  Where they are embedded in unfavourable structures of 
fragmented political decision making and endowed with a narrow range of 
functions, so the prospects for them to bring value to their members are 
unfavourable.  Where they gain access to concentrated political decision 
making structures, so they can be highly influential, quasi autonomous 
intermediaries between government and civil society undertaking public 
interest governance functions.  Where there are shared common interests and 
similar structural characteristics of their members, so trade associations can 
be cohesive and responsive organisations, developing mechanisms to deflect 
external threats.  Some trade associations owe much of their cohesion to 
common external threats from new activism, and have proved adept at 
responding to them in the wider interests of their members.   
 
Trade associations seek to position and reconcile enlightened self interest 
with the broader public interests of civil society.  This approach is also one 
which lies at the heart of corporate social responsibility (Gupta and Brubaker, 
1990).  This chapter has shown that, while trade associations differ greatly in 
their ability to handle the type of issues presented by ‘new activism’, they are 
in concept ideally placed to do so.  They can find and broker collective, 
industry-wide solutions so that no one member faces competitive 
disadvantage in responding to ‘social responsibility’ challenges alone.  
Mechanisms such as self-regulation and environmental standard setting, 
devised and rigorously policed by trade associations so as to ensure 
compliance, can raise overall standards and in doing so protect members and 
meet public interest goals.   As such, they can become part of the solution 
rather than part of the problem.  Where there are problems, trade associations 
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are better placed than their members to take flak because they do not risk 
taking bottom line losses in so doing.  They can lead their members’ 
perceptions of what their interests are on given issues, and engage public 
audiences on issues which are too sensitive for a single company to do so 
alone.  To do all of these things, a trade association needs strength, and 
sufficient independence from its members, together with safeguards to 
prevent it from being over-dominated by any one constituency of members.  In 
turn, these factors enhance public confidence and trust as the association 
delivers on common goods by impartially enforcing standards.  These 
properties of trade associations are common where governments make them 
‘must belong’ organisations for their members by endowing to trade 
associations their recognition as policy and governance partners.  Such 
arrangements are more common to the Germanic, than the Anglo-American, 
models of capitalism.   
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